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Frost: The Constitutionality of an Internet Execution: Lappin v. Enterta

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INTERNET
EXECUTION: LAPPIN V. ENTERTAINMENT
NETWORK, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION

Out of the night that covers me, black as the pit
from pole to pole, I thank whatever gods may be for
my unconquerable soul. In the fell clutch of
circumstance, I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeoning of chance, my head is
bloody, but unbowed... It matters not how strait
the gate, how charge with punishments the scroll. I
am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my
soul.,
-Invictus, William E.Henley
Although convicted Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh,
used this quotation to memorialize his last words, in reality he was
neither "the master of his fate," nor "the captain of his soul."' 2 For
if this had been his true fate, execution, would have been available
to any morbidly curious individual via the Internet, pursuant to3
both his wishes and the aspirations of two Internet companies.
The aforementioned quote is extrapolated from William Henley's
poem Invictus.4 Little did Henley realize at the time of its
composition, that over a hundred years later his poem would be
inextricably associated with one of the most nefarious convicted
terrorists in American history.
In lieu of providing any last words before his execution,
1

Court TV Online, McVeigh ReleasedFinalStatement In The Forum OfA
Poem, at http://www.courttv.com/news/meveighspecial/invictus.html. This
quote is taken from the poem, Invictus, by William Henley, which Timothy
McVeigh offered in lieu of last words before his execution on June 11, 2001.
(emphasis
added).
2id.

3See infra pp. 10-13.
4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

1

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 11

DEPA UL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII: 173

McVeigh's agnosticism shone through as he offered a handwritten
copy of Henley's Invictus.5 It is most likely safe to assume that it
was neither Henley's eloquent verse, nor his master of literary
technique, that attracted McVeigh to this poetry. Rather, McVeigh
must have firmly believed in the powerful underlying message of
Henley's words. However if this assumption is correct, perhaps
Timothy McVeigh should have chosen language more indicative
of his imminent fate, and the final issue that would survive it. If
McVeigh specifically wanted the cynical prose of an infamous
Englishman to represent his last breath, perhaps he should have
more correctly chosen the words of Charles Dickens. Dickens
execution in his work, appropriately titled,
commented on criminal
6
Notes:
American
The prison. . .has been the scene of terrible
performances. Into this narrow, grave-like place,
men are brought out to die. . . . The law requires
that there be present at this dismal spectacle, the
judge, the jury, and citizens to the amount of
twenty-five. From the community it is hidden. To
the dissolute and bad, the thing remains a frigh(4ul
mystery.
These words are much more characteristic of McVeigh's fate,
and of the final controversy that his name would ensue. Tales of
public executions throughout history have neatly been manipulated
into myths, tucked into history books, and portrayed as
characteristic of the uncivilized cultures of antiquity. However, a
well-documented tradition of public executions persists within the
5 Court TV Online, at

http://www.courttv.com/news/mcveigh__special/invictus.html.
6See John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution:Recognizing a
FirstAmendment Right ofAccess to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355,
441 n.53 (1993) (quoting William B. Thesing, The Frame for the Feeling:
Hangings in Poetry by Wordsworth, Patmore and Housman, in Executions and
the British ExperienceFrom the 17'h to the 2 0h Century: A Collection ofEssays
123 (1990) (quoting Charles Dickens, American Notes, 63 (1842)).
7 Id. (emphasis added).
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histories of both Eastern and Western cultures.8
What
significance, if any, does that hold for modem criminal justice
systems? Specifically, what implications do seemingly archaic
execution customs of the past hold in our own contemporary
American society that boasts itself as progressive, capitalist and
constitutionally uninhibited? Particularly American courts, which
have faced questions over media access to prisons and executions
in many jurisdictions, have chosen to maintain the executions, yet
have in many cases decided to take the punishment out of the
public forum. 9 When making this decision, courts have employed
'balancing tests' that emphasize governmental interests, deference
to prison officials and strict adherence to precedent.' ° Modem
courts have refused to deviate from the new "norm" of making
these executions private, thereby finding that the government's
interests outweigh First Amendment guarantees of free press and
speech." Due to the proverbial slippery slope, the public's right to
knowledge and information has also been impeded in these
circumstances. Certainly antiquity recognized the public's right to
view executions, to access information, and to base their societal
conduct upon such information and observation. Why has modem
jurisprudence seemed to limit it?
12
Recently two corporate entities, Entertainment Network Inc.
and Liveontheweb.com Inc. 1 3 attempted to redefine this
precedent. 14 Both Internet companies wanted to broadcast
Timothy McVeigh's execution live; however, Warden Harley
Lappin refused their request pursuant to federal prison board
regulations. 15 Litigation ensued and the District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana in Entm't Network v. Lappin, 16
8

See infra pp. 5-8.
9 See infra pp. 15-27.
10Id.
11Id.
12 See generallyEntertainment Network, at
http://www.entertaimnentnetwork.com.
13 See generallyLiveontheweb.com, at http://www.liveontheweb.com.
14 See infra pp. 8-13.
1SSee Id1
16
Entm'tNetwork v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d 1002 (S. D. Ind. 2001) infta.
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predictably, denied the media access to the execution. 17 Although
justifications exist for restricting First Amendment rights, none of
these rudimentary justifications applied in Lappin.18
The purposes of this Note is not to argue that courts should
begin to allow all executions to be aired over the Internet. The
result of such a decision would likely be the capitalization over the
death of another and a disregard for human life which could
arguably transport criminal justice back to the standards of Nero's
Rome or the French Revolution. Nor will this Note attempt to
confront the controversy surrounding the propriety and legality of
the death penalty. Nevertheless this Note will examine the court's
decision in Lappin, by comparing this case of first impression to
analogous case law in order to demonstrate that the District
Court's theory was flawed.19
Section II will provide essential background necessary to
understand the constitutional quandary that was placed before the
court in Lappin.20 Specifically, this section will provide a brief
illustration of the significance that public executions played during
our country's formative years and the significance of Timothy
McVeigh's execution. The third section will discuss both the facts
and the rationale used by the court in Lappin.21 Section IV will
provide an analysis of that opinion. 2 Because Lappin is a case of
first impression, the analysis will look to analogous case law, such
as media access case law, access-to-prison case law, and Gulf War
case law, in order to compare the respective jurisprudence and to
the rationale used in Lappin. Section V will discuss the future
implications the Lappin holding will have, and question this
holding in light of public policy on execution broadcasting and the
tragic events of September 11, 2001.3 Finally, Section V will
conclude by calling for greater judicial activism when courts are
Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1019.
" See infra Part III.
'9See infra pp. 5-42.
20
See infra pp. 5-9.
21See infra pp. 9-13.
17

22 See infra pp. 14-30.
23 See infra pp. 31-42.
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faced with extreme or unique issues, such as the ones presented in
Lappin.24
H. BACKGROUND

The value system of contemporary "Americana" has
traditionally shunned the concept of public executions,
categorizing such behavior as characteristic of barbaric cultures of
the past, or undemocratic governments of the present. However,
historical record has revealed that public executions have
performed a vital role throughout the development of societal
control norms and the criminal justice systems of almost every
modem community. 25 Public executions can be traced back to
before the days of Jesus Christ, where the fate of the incarcerated
was inevitable doom as men 26
were publicly pitted against savage
'justice.'
of
name
the
beasts in
Arguably, various forms of public execution have permeated the
Twentieth Century with the Holocaust and the practice of Sati in
India as just two examples.27 Most recently, the Taliban's
demoralizing "legal system," which has reinstituted the stoning of

24 See infra pp. 40-42.
25 See, Gil Santamarina, The Casefor Televised Executions, 11 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.. 101, 102 (1992) (stating that the last two public executions in
America were the hangings of Rainey Bethea in Kentucky in 1936 and Roscoe
Jackson in Missouri in 1937); Phillip R. Wiese, Popcorn and Primetime vs
Protocol: An Examination of the Televised Execution Issue, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 257, 260 (1996); see also Bessler, supranote 6, at 359-67 (commenting on
the scholarly disagreement over whether the 1936 Kentucky execution or the
1937 Missouri execution, can in fact, be considered the last public execution).
26
Wiese, supra note 25, at 259-60 ("Interest and attraction to the public
administration of the death penalty is a phenomenon which no doubt pre-dates
the era of television, radio and other contemporary tools of fast paced, media
retrieval and reporting").
27 Sati is a traditional Hindu ritual that occurred in certain areas of India where,
once widowed, a woman bums herself alive at a stake, or a 'pyre', in a public
venue. Although highly controversial and now illegal, one of the last reported
instances of Sati occurred in 1987. For an account from eyewitnesses to this
event see generallyMARK TULLY, No FULL STOPS ININDIA 211-236 (1991).
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women, serves as a poignant example of public executions. 28
However, a tradition of public executions is not merely restricted
to cultures of 'the Other,' that is cultures that many Americans
would deem as undemocratic. 29 Rather, despite its quintessential
civility, Anglo-American jurisprudence also possesses a tradition
marked by public executions that extends into the Twentieth
Century. This section will briefly recap the development of public
executions in the American criminal justice system in order to
point out its significant place within American legal history.
History provides little documented insight into whether the
Founding Fathers intended for the press to broadcast an execution,
as indeed no one from the Eighteenth Century could have foreseen
the technological advances that have made such broadcasting
possible. However, their intent has been highly debated and an
examination of history reveals that public executions were routine
at the time contemporaneous to the framing of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, one surety amid such debate is that the Framers did
not explicitly prohibit public access to executions within the
Constitution. Moreover, the Founding Fathers designed a very
broad freedom of the press in the First Amendment.3 ° Therefore,
if the Founding Fathers had no explicit problems with public
executions and intended for a liberal press, then why is it absurd to
imagine that in extreme circumstances they would have intended
for media access to and subsequent broadcast of executions?

28 See

generally, Sara Austin, Where are the Women? DebatingAfghanistan's

Future,THE NATION, Dec. 31, 2001, at 11-14.
29 See generally,EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Random House 1978). The
term 'the Other' has been employed throughout academia, specifically by
cultural theorists such as Edward Said, to construct critical theories about the
Third World and the Western perception of it. Specifically 'the Other' refers to
non-Western cultures, and a negative production of knowledge, before
colonization imposed Western ideals upon these indigenous societies.
30
U.S. CONST. amend. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
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A. The Tradition of PublicExecutions within American
Jurisprudence
Although downplayed by American historiography, public
executions were, in fact, legal in many jurisdictions, with the last
31
documented instance occurring as recently as the late 1930s.
Despite the utilitarian goals of the original colonists who fled from
a oppressive monarchy, public executions were not uncommon in
their newly established democracy. 32 Rather, one commentator
has stated that public executions were the "norm" in postrevolutionary America up until the early nineteenth century. 33 The
overriding policy supporting these public executions was the
preservation of social order, believing that criminal activity would
34
be deterred if capital punishment were made a public spectacle.
However, this social order policy rationale becomes ironic when
considering certain contemporary prison officials have cited the
preservation of order as one of the reasons againstmedia coverage
35
of executions.
As American society continued to flourish, so did crime, and
thus so did public executions. However, by the 1830s an
increasingly strong backlash against public executions began to
emerge. 36 One scholar has suggested that "the move to exclude
31
32

See Bessler, supra note 6, at 360-63.
Id.In using the term "utilitarian goal," I am referring to the utilitarian school

of thought that emerged in eighteenth century English academia, which was a

product of the Enlightenment philosophy that promoted individual production of
knowledge and scientific progression.
33 See Santamarina, supra note 25, at 101.
34
See Bessler, supra note 6, at 359, 360 ("Printed versions of the sermon and
confession helped disseminate the execution day message throughout the crowd
and
across the region").
35
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36
See Bessler, supra note 6, at 360-63 (discussing New York's public execution
abolition movement and New England's private execution laws, which were
some of the first enacted and that recognized a right to privacy for executions).
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the public from executions was apparently motivated by a desire to
make executions more civilized and by a fear that well-publicized
executions would fan sentiment to abolish capital punishment
altogether." 37 For example, in 1830, Connecticut was the first
state to promulgate legislation that required executions to be
outside of the public view. 38 The Supreme Court first spoke on
this issue in its 1890 decision in Holden v. Minnesota.39 In Holden
the Supreme Court gave deference to the state legislatures that
enacted anti-public execution statutes, relied upon the legislatures'
good faith incentive to protect its citizens, and upheld Minnesota's
complete ban on media and public access to executions.4 °
Therefore, Holden represents the beginning of the Supreme
Court's initial step away from the customary colonial practice of
open executions and an indication of future courts' treatment of
access to executions.
Courts' attitudes on access to executions have evolved since the
days of Holden, leading to the current limited media and public
41
presence at executions as proscribed by federal statute.
However, the process was as gradual as Holden itself did not
require the cessation of all public executions. Rather the tradition
continued in certain areas, particularly the South, with the last two
documented public executions occurring in 1936 and 1937, in
Kentucky and Missouri respectively. 42
Furthermore, public
executions were not even nationally forbidden until the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. 43 To this date, the
See id. at 438 n. 17 (citingDavis, The Movement to Abolish Capital
Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST. REv. 23, 33-34 (1957)).
38See Wiese, supra note 25, at 260, 261 (stating that New York, Massachusetts,
37

Pennsylvania Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, and six Midwestern states followed
with their own legislation shortly after Connecticut).
39 137 U.S. 483 (1890).
4
0

41

id.

See infra pp. 14-30.

See Wiese, supra note 25, at 261.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that if a state imposes
the death penalty in an "arbitrary or capricious" mode than it constitutes a
constitutional violation and "cruel and unusual punishment" as forbidden by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
42

43
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Supreme Court has still not extended the media's
right of access to
44
general.
in
public
the
of
that
past
executions
B. The Execution of Timothy McVeigh within American
Jurisprudence
On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in
Oklahoma City exploded killing168 people, 19 of which were
children.45 Apart from being an unimaginable travesty for the
family and friends of the victims, the Oklahoma City bombing was
a national tragedy. American and International commentators
alike recognized the bombing as the most severe domestic terrorist
act until the recent events of September 11th.46
For his
responsibility in this tragedy, a jury convicted Timothy McVeigh
of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, use of weapons
of mass destruction, destruction by explosives, first-degree
murder. He was sentenced
to death by the District Court for the
47
Colorado.
of
District
McVeigh spent his entire incarceration imprisoned at the United
States Penitentiary of Terre Haute.48
McVeigh's original
execution was scheduled for May 16, 2001 .49 However, after the
defense discovered 4,000 previously unrevealed FBI investigative
documents, the court granted McVeigh a stay of execution. At that
point, President Bush was the only force that could have prevented
the execution through a grant of clemency. President Bush was
petitioned by Pope John Paul II, death penalty opponents, and even
a few bombing survivors to prevent the execution in order that
McVeigh endure life imprisonment as opposed to being

44 See infra pp. 14-30.
45

46

Frank J. Murray, McVeigh awaits Public Death, The Washington Times, Al.
See id.; US Judge rules Against Webcasting ofOklahoma Bomber's

Execution, Agence France Presse, April 20, 2000; CourtTV Online, at
http://www.courttv.com/news/mcvieghspecia/0612 noremorse ap.html.
47
See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1007'(1999).
48 See Murray, supra note 45, at Al.
49 id.
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executed.5 0 However, these pleas were of no avail and McVeigh's
stay was short lived. s'
Not surprisingly, considering his ardent support of the death
penalty, President Bush did not grant clemency. 2 On June 16,
2001 McVeigh was put to death by legal injection.5 3 However, the
various ploys attempting to broadcast his execution assure that
McVeigh's legacy will not solely be marked by the innumerable
atrocities that he caused. McVeigh's execution will also be
remembered for the unique legal question it presented - should
First Amendment protection incorporate the broadcast of a federal
execution via the Internet? The answer to that question, however,
remains unclear.

III.

54
ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK V. LAPPIN

This section will discuss the focus of this Note, Entm 't Network
v. Lappin, in great detail.5 5 Specifically, the section will examine
the District Court's rationale in upholding the constitutionality of
the federal regulation that barred Plaintiffs, Entertainment
Network Inc. and Liveontheweb.com, from broadcasting
McVeigh's execution on June 11, 2001.
A. BackgroundFacts
Entertainment Network, Inc. ("ENI"), an Internet company that
provides news, entertainment, and information, petitioned the
Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to be the media pool witness to
50

d.

51

d; President Bush oversaw 152 executions during his five years as governor

of Texas granting him an international reputation as "Mr. Death Penalty." See
Thomas Sancton, A Matter of Life or Death, The McVeigh Case Shows How
Differently Europe and America View CapitalPunishment,TIME, May 21, 2001,
at 28.
52 Id.; see also supra note 1 (quoting President Bush's statement that
McVeigh
"....
met
the
fate
he
chose
for
himself
six
years
ago").
5
3 See supra note 1.
54
Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d 1002.
" Id. at 1007.
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McVeigh's execution. 56 In a letter dated March 20, 2001, ENI
requested not only to represent the media at the execution, it also
asked for permission to bring a small camera into the execution to
record and broadcast the execution over the internet.57 ENI also
asked the BOP for access to and permission to broadcast a live
audiovisual version of the execution. 8 On March 28, 2001, the
BOP rejected ENI's request, justifying its decision on federal
regulation 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) ("regulation"). 5 9 This regulation
prohibits the photography, recording, or broadcasting of a federal
execution. 60 Additionally, the BOP relied on various policy
rejecting ENI's request to broadcast McVeigh's
reasons for
61
execution.
Subsequently ENI filed suit, joined shortly thereafter by
Liveontheweb.com, Inc. as an intervening plaintiff (collectively
"Plaintiffs"), against Harry Lappin, Warden of Terre Haute
Penitentiary ('USPTH"), and other government officials
Plaintiffs based their
(collectively "the government").62
constitutional claims specifically on First Amendment violations
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.63 The District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana heard the matter on April 17,
2001 and upheld the constitutionality of the regulation in question,
28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f).64 Thus, the court entered judgment for
65
Defendants, refusing to extend First Amendment protection.
Plaintiffs did not appeal and at McVeigh's execution 24 witnesses
were present, none of which possessed audio or recording
56

id.
1d. at 1008.
5
8id.
59 Lappin,
134 F. Supp.2d at 1008; 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) states in relevant part that
"No photographic or visual or audio recording of the execution shall be
28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) (2000).
permitted."
60
Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1008; 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f).
61 See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1017.
57

62 Id.
at

1006. Collectively defendants consisted of Lappin, Kathleen Haw

Sawyer, Director
63
Id"
6

of the BOP, and John Ashcroft U.S. Attorney General.

id.

65

Id.at 1019.
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devices.66
B. The Court'sAnalysis
Lappin presented a case of first impression for the District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana. 67 The issue before the court
was a facial challenge to a regulation that prohibited broadcasting,
filming or audio recording of a federal execution and that Plaintiffs
claimed infringed upon their First Amendment media and free
speech rights. 68 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the regulation
69
was content-based and consequently subject to strict scrutiny.
Defendants, on the other hand, contended that regulation was
necessary because of the need to (1) prevent the sensationalizing
of executions, (2) preserve of the solemnity of executions, (3)
maintenance of security and good order in the Federal Prison
System, and (4) the protection of the privacy rights of the
condemned, the victims and their families.7 °
First, the court in Lappin rejected the notion that the regulation
was content based.71 Judge Tinder acknowledged that making the
distinction between a content-neutral and a content-based
regulation can sometimes become "onerous. 72 However, he did
not find the task of assessing this regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f),
to be a difficult one. 73 Rather, quoting the Supreme Court, the
Lappin court reiterated that a regulation is content-based if it
prohibits speech because of disfavored content.74 In light of this
66

See supra note 1.
generally Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d 1002.
68
Id; 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f) (2000).
69
Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1015.
70
id. at 1017.
71Id. at 1014.
72
See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1014.
67 See

73

id.

74

Id.(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) ("The
principle inquiry in determining content neutrality... is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys") (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642-3
(1994), "Regulations that 'by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or view expressed are content based"').
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rule, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument which differentiated
between the content portrayed by traditional written media and that
conveyed by the Internet. 75 It stated, "In short, as to this aspect of
ENI's argument, the medium is not the message, and ENI, as to the
would-be messenger, is not being discriminated against by the
BOP's regulation because of the. medium or means by which ENI
seeks to broadcast the execution." 76 Therefore, the court refused
to apply strict scrutiny because it found that the BOP regulation
was content-neutral and it did not prohibit the "free flow" of
77
information.

The first justification was that the regulation was contentneutral. 78 Where a regulation is content-based courts will apply
strict scrutiny because the regulation in question most likely is
related to the suppression of free speech, whereas when a
regulation is content-neutral the courts wil employ a more lucid
standard of review. 7 9 The Lappin court's second reason for not
applying strict scrutiny was because the content-neutral regulation
was merely a "time, place and manner" restriction on
speech,
80
interests."
government
"legitimate
by
which was justified
ENI's claim was based on a right to access the execution
81
because the regulation already provided limited media access.
The Court engaged in an analysis of "right of access"
jurisprudence in order to reaffirm common law notions of equal
access for both the media and the public. It plainly relied upon the
Supreme Court's promulgation that the media is not afforded
greater access to information than that provided to the public in

75

Id. at 1014 ("ENI's argument rests on the view that the "contenf' of an
execution depicted through the form of written journals or verbal accounts is
different than if depicted through the lens and tape of the audiovisual broadcast
which
ENI seeks to have authorized").
76

Id. at 1015.

"
Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1015.
78

id.

790Id. at 1014; See also Wiese, supra note 25 at 400-401.

'81 Id. at 1015 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
Id. at 1010 n.2 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.64, which provides the procedure
creating a media pool for a federal execution).
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general.82 Because this is a case of first impression, Judge Tinder
rendered analogous arguments in order to demonstrate how courts
have upheld other federal regulations, which deal with the media's
right to access judicial proceedings and prisons. 83 Lappin looked
to a variety of case law, none of which was binding upon itself,
and engaged in case by case analysis from "similar84areas" in order
to justify the application of the precedent it upheld.
IV. ANALYSIS

The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
85
that abridges the freedom of speech or the freedom of the press.
Anglo-American jurisprudence contains an ongoing struggle
between the press and speech clauses in an attempt to illustrate and
define the limits and maxims of these freedoms. The following
section will discuss case law that the Lappin court found as
persuasive. However, unlike Lappin, this discussion will provide
a critical viewpoint of the case law's applicability to a media claim
to access an execution where the Internet is the desired medium of
communication. Moreover, many of these cases can actually be
distinguished from Lappin because of its unique facts. Although
the cases that Lappin discussed involved traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps the court should have
acknowledged the distinction between those cases and the issues
that were present in Lappin. The battle between the Free Speech
Clause and the Free Press Clause is not a novel concept to the area
of constitutional law. In the past, judicial review has led to the
struggle of balancing the competing interests of what can
sometimes be considered two contradictory First Amendment
82

Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1009-11 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,

584 (1965) (Warren, J., concurring) ("When representatives of the

communications media attend trials they have no greater rights than other
members of the public") (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17).
83 Id. at 1009-14.
8 See infra pp. 14-30.
85

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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guarantees.
This analysis will examine Lappin in light of a series of
analogous constitutional quandaries, distinguishing this case law in
order to question the findings of Lappin. This section will point
out the contradiction of the Lappin holding in light of other
situations, situations that are arguably as graphic as the one at
issue, in which the government has not imposed restrictions.
Moreover, the significance of the role of the Internet in Lappin
will be discussed. Furthermore this section will suggest that in
future situations as dramatic and unique as that illustrated by
Lappin, future courts should not just follow precedent in order to
deter controversy, in lieu of deviating from the norm. Rather,
courts should engage in constructive criticism, where necessary, of
that precedent established by other case law with divergent factual
situations.
A. Media Access Jurisprudence
Although no court has ever adjudicated an issue point on
provision with Lappin, the courts have dealt with the extent of the
media's First Amendment protection in other contexts. The
Lappin decision relied upon a variety of case law in order to
uphold 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(f). Although the court considered these
cases "analogous," it failed to recognize the inherent factual
differences between the unique Lappin situation and the cases it
discussed. Instead, the court in Lappin upheld the regulation on
the basis that the common law has not afforded the media access to
information greater than that of the public. 86 However the court
never once questioned whether the media should have greater
access- than the public generally in special circumstances.

86

See supra pp. 10-13.
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1. The Accessibility of Information: The Evolution of the Right to
Access Information

a. Zemel v. Rusk
The Supreme Court defined the parameters of the media's
constitutional right to gather information in Zemel v. Rusk. 87 In
Zemel, the government denied the plaintiff a passport to Cuba
when he wanted to satisfy his "curiosity about the state of affairs
in Cuba. . ." which in his opinion was going to make him "a better,
informed citizen." 88 Chief Justice Warren disagreed and held that
the "right to speak and publish does not carry with it unrestrained
right to gather information." 89 Therefore the Court rendered a
broad interpretation of the First Amendment, but the majority
refused to create a special privilege for the media.
In a formalistic dissent Justice Black noted that the Constitution
states that only Congress should enact laws restricting individual
liberty. 90 He hinged his criticism on Constitutional intent, that the
Constitution does not allow for laws dealing with rights so
fundamental to be decided by a government official. Only
Congress, according to Justice Black, via the Constitution, can
promulgate regulations that may potentially impinge upon
liberty. 91 Although Justice Black would most likely have frowned
upon an overly active judiciary who arbitrary overrules legislation,
he also would have equally rejected the notion that a prison
warden should be provided with the last word in circumstances as
exceptional as those in Lappin. Justice Black's view of who
" 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
s81 d. at 3-4.
9
90 1d. at

16.
Id. at 22 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution has ordained that laws

restricting the liberty of our people can be engaged by the Congress and by the
Congress only. I do not think that our Constitution intended that this vital
legislative function could be fanned out in large blocks to any governmental
official, whoever he might be, or to any governmental department of bureau,
whatever administrative expertise it might be thought to have").
91

Id.
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decides liberty fights under the Due Process Clause of the 14e
Amendment, 92 should perhaps, be applicable to contemporaneous
media access to executions, specifically in McVeigh's situation.
b. Branzbergv. Hayes
Subsequently, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether the First Amendment protects the media from
governmental inquiries. Does the government have access to a
journalist's information and research in the context of a judicial
proceeding? In Branzbergv. Hayes,93 defendant Branzberg was a
reporter who had witnessed illegal drug transactions and had
written about them in the newspaper. 94 A Grand Jury subpoenaed
him about this information and Branzberg refused to appear before.
it, claiming a violation of freedom of the press and the free flow of
information. 95 However, the Court disagreed with Branzberg and
found that the media does not have a right over the public to evade
Grand Juries. 96 However, Justice White did acknowledge that
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press would be eviscerated. 97 Furthermore, in dissent, Justice
Stewart emphasized the "critical role" of an independent press and
that the majority undermined this historic independence when it
held that8 the media has no First Amendment right to protect its
9

sources.

In Lappin, Judge Tinder relied upon Justice White's now
celebrated quote that is provided in the above paragraph. In doing
so, he acknowledged constitutional protection of the press but
quickly qualified this protection as limited in certain
92

U.S. CONST.amend.

XIV.

9'408 U.S. 665 (1972).

94 Id at 669.

95 Id.
Branzburg had

to protect his
96
97

Id.at 681.

sought legal protection through prohibition and mandamus

confidential information.

Id.at 726.

98Branzberg,408

U.S. at 675 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The reporter's
constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source stems from the
broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public").
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circumstances. 99 Further, the court in Lappin interpreted ENI's
claim narrowly based on the fact that they were not one of the
media bodies chosen to witness the execution, as opposed to one
based on the constitutionality of the federal regulation in question.
c. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia
Although the Supreme Court has refused to recognize special
access rights for the media with executions, it has extended the
press and public's equal access rights to observe certain
governmental proceedings.100 In the seminal decision in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia,10' the Court relied in part on Branzberg in
order to extend a general right of access to criminal trials. 0 2 Chief
Justice Burger's majority consisted of seven.10 3 Each engaged in
a historical explanation of the open criminal tradition in AngloAmerican jurisprudence. 10 4 Justice Burger found that the right to
criminal trials is one embedded in the free speech clause, as is the
right to engage in govenment-oriented speech, and for one of the
10 5
first times recognized the courtroom as an open forum.
However, the Chief Justice was reluctant to allow for an overly
broad First Amendment interpretation. Moreover, he set out two
factors that limit the First Amendment right to access criminal

99

Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1009 ("Although substantial, the protection is not
without limits").
1oo See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S 555 (1980) (allowing press
access to criminal trials); Press-Enterprise Co v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984) (applying RichmondNewspapers to voir dire examination of perspective
jurors in a criminal trial); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1
(1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (applying Richmond Newspapers to preliminary
hearings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(allowing press access to trials involving sex crimes against children under 18
years of age).
101 448 U.S 555 (1980).
102 Id.

103 Id. at 555-59 (composing a majority of seven, and out of the seven justices,

six
came to the same conclusion based on totally separate rationales).
1
4Id.
'0 5 Id,at 575-77.
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trials. 106 These factors are (1) that the right of access should only
have "special force" when the government has already been open,
and (2) that the presence of the press should relate to the
underlying purposes of the proceeding. 10 7 This test is disjunctive,
thus, if a media representative does not satisfy either of these
factors, then the media will not gain access to a criminal
proceeding.
Justice Stevens, a frequent champion of extending broad First
Amendment rights to the media, delivered a powerful concurrence
that recognized this case as a "watershed case."' 0 8 Stevens stated,
"until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to
the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it
squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled
to any constitutional protection whatsoever." °9 Stevens saw no
reason to justify the closure order at issue in this case and
commented upon the full rights of access that the media should be
accorded. The court in Lappin noted that Richmond Newspapers
rejected absolute First Amendment rights to the public and press
and emphasized the court's contention that a trial judge may
impose reasonable restrictions on access to a criminal trial. 110
However, Lappin failed to note that the court was equating media
access to a criminal trial with that of the public, and thus,
emphasizing the media's First Amendment rights. "
Lappin stated that "the First Amendment right to gather news
has been defined in terms of information available to the public
generally."' " 2 In Lappin, a select portion of the media and the
public was allowed to listen to McVeigh's execution. According
106 Richmond Newspapers, 448
107

U.S. at 589, 593-97.
Id.
'o'
Id.at 582.
109 Id.
" 0 See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1016 (quoting Richmond Newspapers "Just as
a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon
the use of its stresses in the interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic,
so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration ofjustice, impose
reasonable limitations on access to a trial").

I See id.
12Id.at

1010.
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to federal BOP regulations certain members of the public are
allowed to watch an execution, and this right includes both
listening and seeing the execution live from an observation area.
113 At McVeigh's execution 24 members of the public and press
were in attendance, all of whom got to see and listen to the
execution. 114 There seems to be an underlying double standard, a
discriminatory angle perhaps, for a regulation that allows certain
members of the public and media to attend the execution, but not
all members of the public. The media is the tool that would truly
allow all members of the public and press to have the same access,
to see and listen to an execution. In this situation, the rights of the
press and public did not seem to apply coextensively, specifically
when considering the government's response to the McVeigh
situation.
As a result of the horrific circumstances of McVeigh's crime,
Attorney General John Ashcroft deviated from the standard
115
regulation that limits the amount of execution eyewitnesses.
The Attorney General allowed 250 people, all family members and
friends of bombing victims, to watch the execution in Oklahoma
City off of a live satellite feed from USTPH. 116 By doing so he
violated his own regulation, the one at issue in Lappin, which
states in relevant part that "no photographic or visual or audio
recording of the execution shall be permitted." ' 1 7 That is, Ashcroft
violated his own regulation because in order to air the execution
28 C.F.R. § 26.4(c) (2000) (stating that in addition to a federal Marshal and
the prison warden the following can be present for an execution: (1) necessary
personnel appointed by the Marshal and Warden; (2) attorneys for the
Department of Justice designated by the Attorney General; (3) persons selected
by the prisoner including (i) one spiritual adviser; (ii) two defense attorneys;
(iii) three adult friends/relatives; and (4) persons selected by the Warden
including:
(i) eight citizens, and (ii) ten press representatives).
4
11 See supra note
1.
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b)(1) ("The control and management of Federal penal
and correctional institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be vested
in the Attorney General, who shall promulgate rules for the government thereof.
13

Mike Doming, Hundreds will watch McVeigh die; Ashcroft Approves
Closed-CircuitTV, CHiCAGO TRIBUNE, April 13, 2001, at 1.
117 28 C.F.R. § 26.4(0 (2000).
16
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live in Oklahoma City, he had to use the most sophisticated
recording equipment to ensure the security of the broadcast. 118 It
was, in fact, the largest execution audience since the early
twentieth century when public executions were legal.
Without undermining either the pain of the bombing victims'
families and loved ones, or their specific vested interest in
McVeigh's fate, it seems hypocritical that a select portion of them
were allowed to witness McVeigh's last moments while the rest of
the public was not. It especially seems hypocritical when,
according to the affidavit of an ENI attorney, Ashcroft himself
admitted publicly that all Americans were victims of McVeigh's
crime. Why then were only a select group of victims allowed to
view the execution? The Attorney General's policy of allowing a
selective group, randomly chosen through lottery, to view the
execution violated the federal regulation in question in Lappin.
Considering these inconsistencies perhaps the Lappin court upheld
the regulation unconstitutionally, or at least too hastily applied a
lucid standard of review, when its application excluded certain
members of the public due to the "Ashcroft exception." Allowing
Plaintiffs the ability to air the execution over the Internet may have
counteracted this inconsistency and compensated for the seeming
inconsistency between government policy and government
practice by providing the rest of the public with equal access to
this information.
Instead the court relied upon a proxy argument in order apply
precedent, circumvent a holding that may disturb the government,
and consequently cater to governmental discrimination about a
highly sensitive topic. Lappin emphasized that any witnesses to
McVeigh's execution were not allowed to record the execution,
therefore the media should not be allowed to." 9 Furthermore, the
"public" as a whole was going to be represented by proxy through
members of the public in attendance. 12 0 The court reasoned that
the public had access vicariously through the witnesses present,
the media had access, and therefore there was no constitutional
Doming, supra note 116, at 1.
"9 Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1010.
120 1-d.
118
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12
violation of First Amendment equal access jurisprudence. 1
However, the written stipulation at trial acknowledged the
Attorney General's deviation and stated that "survivors and
122
victims" of bombings would be allowed to view the execution.
According to Richmond Newspapers the government cannot
arbitrarily close the doors on criminal trials, because they had a
tradition of being open when the First Amendment speech and
press clauses were created. 123 Why should this standard not apply
to an execution as significant as McVeigh's, especially when John
Ashcroft himself has recognized124
that the McVeigh case presented
circumstances?'
of
set
a "unique
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate an initial
glimpse at the courts growing tendency to provide the media with
informational access since the days of Holden. Justice Stevens,
125
undoubtedly, had the most progressive outlook for the time.
Lappin applies the series of general right to access in its decision
but fails to consider creative judicial ideology such as the rationale
of Justice Stevens. Rather, the Lappin court overlooked judicial
activism, failed to question any precedent, or at least distinguish
that precedent from the unique issue that was before the court. It
follows then, perhaps, that the Lappin court ignored the extreme
significance of First Amendment rights in order to pacify the
governmental desire not to broadcast McVeigh's execution.

2. Media Access to Prisons:The Prison Cases
The Supreme Court has also spoke on media access to prisons
generally. Lappin relied on these prison access cases, but again,
these cases are distinguishable from the unique issue presented
2

1 1 id.

'2 2

Id. at 1008.

124

See Doming, supra note 117 at 1 (quoting Ashcroft as stating that "This case

123See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575-76.

has many unique elements and it is a unique set of circumstances that confront
us.. .the Oklahoma City survivors may be the largest group of crime victims in
our history").
25 See generallyRichmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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before the court in Lappin.
a. Companion Cases: Pell and Saxbe
In companion cases, Pell v. Procunier,126 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 127 the Court was faced with the media's
right to access interviews with federal prisoners. Justice Stewart
delivered both majority opinions. The issue in both cases was the
constitutionality of regulations that prohibited face-to-face
interviews between a media representative and specific types of
prisoners. 128 Furthermore, Stewart stated that while the First
Amendment does prohibit the government from interfering with
free press, it does not mandate the"... government to accord the
press special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally."' 129 The prison regulations in question prevented
interviews with specific prison inmates, 130 and the Supreme Court
upheld these regulations, again, on the equal access principle.'31
However in dissent to Saxbe Justice Powell, with whom Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, shunned the majority for its limited
First Amendment interpretation in light of the necessity, in certain
circumstances, for the press to gather and have access to
information. 132 Furthermore, Justice Powell found Plaintiff's
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1978).
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1978).
' 28Pell, 417 U.S. 817; Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843.
'29 Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843.
126
127

30

See Pell,417 U.S. at 819; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
Pell,417 U.S. at 829-30 ("Plaintiffs... rely on their right to gather news

13 1 See

without governmental interference, which media plaintiffs assert includes a right
to access to the sources of what is regarded as newsworthy information"); see
also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844-45 ("An informed public depends on accurate and

effective reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain for himself the
information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political
responsibilities").
132

Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 856-64 (Powell, J., dissenting) ('From all that appears in
the Court's opinion, one would think that any governmental restriction on
access to information, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally
acceptable to the majority so long as it does not single out the media for special
disabilities not applicable to the public at large... I cannot follow the Court in
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request for face-to-face interviews as one that is "essential to
effective reporting in the prison context."' 133 Although Justice
134
Powell did not recognize media rights as superior to the public,
he did explicate the imperative role of the freedom of the press, as
well as the public's right to be informed.
b. Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
Additionally, the Supreme Court was presented with the issue of
media access to prisons again in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 135
Houchins involved a radio station's right to use a camera, record,
film, and make sound recordings in certain areas of a prison, all to
be published by either newspapers, television or radio. 136 The
Houchins court followed Pell and Saxbe in finding that the
media's right to access is coextensive with that of the public in
general. 137 Chief Justice Burger stated that "[u]nder our holdings
in Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co .. .the
media have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail
different from
or greater, than that accorded to the public
13 8
generally."
However, in a powerful dissent Justice Stevens condemned the
court for applying Pell and Saxbe as authoritative precedent
because Appellee's KQED, Inc., claim did not rest on the fact that
the press should have had greater access than the public. 139 Justice
Stevens commented on the public's right to be informed of prison
conditions, which could only be disseminated through the media,

concluding that any governmental restriction on press access to information, so
long as it is nondiscriminatory,falls outside the purview of First Amendment
concern").
(emphasis added).
133 1d. at 861.
134
Id. at 857.
135438 U.S. 1 (1978).
136id.
137 id.

13

1

Id. at 15-16.

13 9 Id. at 25.
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thus placing emphasis on the First Amendment. 140 Furthermore,
he stated that "without some protection for the acquisition of
information about the operation of public institutions at large, the
process of self-governance14 contemplated by the Framers would be
stripped of its substance."'
c.

Garrettv. Estelle

Various -circuits have dealt with media access to government
information in general. The most salient example was heard in the
Fifth Circuit, which was the first federal circuit to adjudicate the
question of whether a state can enjoin the media from filming an
execution. 142 In Garrettv. Estelle 43 the media was allowed access
to an execution, however, they were prohibited from recording the
execution once present in the witness chambers. 144 Garrett
involved a challenge to a Texas regulation that prohibited
television filming of state executions and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, reversing the District Court, upheld Texas law. It
relied upon the principle of equal access, stating that since
selective media members were allowed to witness the execution
145
the public and the media had indeed been extended equal access.
This Fifth Circuit decision has been quoted frequently,
specifically when the media's right to televise executions has been
an issue. The court in Lappin applied it as if the decision was
directly on point. Lappin is highly distinguishable from Garrettin
two ways: its content and its controversy. The Garrett court held
that the Texas regulation was constitutional because the public has
1 46
no right to broadcast the execution, either should the media.
Lappin relied upon an almost identical proposition but failed to
140 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30-1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In addition to

safeguarding the right of one individual to receive what another elects to
communicate,
the First Amendment serves as an essential societal function").
141
Id. at 32.
142 See Bessler, supranote 6, at 7-8 and accompanying text.
'43

556 F.2d 1274 (5 h Cir. 1977).

'44Id. at 1278.
45
1 Id.
14 6 Id. at 1279.
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distinguish Garrett from its issue. In Garrett, Plaintiffs argued
that the government must show a "compelling state interest"
before First Amendment rights can be eroded. 147 The court's
response was that "balancing a public interest against an
individual's constitutional right has been used when the two are
found to be inconsistent. 1 48 Thus, this is one major distinguishing
factor between Garrettand Lappin. Whereas in Garrett the court
found that there was no inconsistency that would prompt a
balancing test, the facts of Lappin did present an inconsistency
when a certain class of the public were allowed live access to
McVeigh's execution and the remaining members of the public
were denied access.
In the alternative, all of the aforementioned cases can be read to
distinguish the unique issue in Lappin. First Pell, Saxbe, and
Houchins involved routine media prison investigations, including
interviews and photographs, while Lappin involved a much more
serious issue of significant public interest. Secondly, these prison
access cases can be read to allow for Plaintiffs request in
Lappin.14 9 These cases rely upon equal access to press and public.
Nevertheless, equal access was denied when the Lappin court
denied Plaintiffs' request to air McVeigh's execution over the
Internet. The Internet is a medium that would have allowed the
public at large to view the execution, just as the witnesses in the
execution chamber and those in Oklahoma City were able to. In
light of the series of cases just discussed, it may seem that the
Lappin decision was either incorrect, inevitable, or both.
However, Lappin should not be dismissed so easily, not only
147 Id.

Garrett,556 F.2d at 1279.
See Jeff Angeja, Televising California'sDeath Penalty:Is There a
ConstitutionalRight to BroadcastExecutions?, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1489, 1505
148

149

(1992) ("It makes no sense to deny the press the freedom to gather and
disseminate information on the grounds that this freedom is also denied to the
public. If it is constitutionally questionable to deny this freedom to the press, it
should be no more constitutional to deny it to both the public and the press. The
Garrett opinion suggests that an otherwise questionable practice of denying
press access to information is made legitimate by denying access to everyone
equally... this ruling set a dangerous precedent... ")

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss1/11

26

2002]

Frost: The Constitutionality of an Internet Execution: Lappin v. Enterta

BROADCASTING AND THE DEATH PENALTY

199

because of its controversial subject matter, but also because of its
potential future influence.
3. The Media's Right ofAccess UnderExceptional
Circumstances:

a. The Gulf War Litigation
Times of warfare have created political, and socio-economic
exceptions to societal norms and comforts. Specifically, the
Supreme Court has recognized an exception to First Amendment
protection in order to preserve national security in times of
conflict. 150 According to common law jurisprudence, national
security is an exception to First Amendment freedom.' 5 '
Restrictive media coverage during the Gulf War was a salient
example of government regulation of the media's First
Amendment right to access information.
The court in Lappin, analogized its restriction of media access to
that imposed by the government during the Gulf War. Two
specific causes of action evolved out the Gulf War that dealt with
the media's right to access information in light of government
regulation. 152 Lappin relied upon J-P Picturse, Inc. v. Dept. of
Defense153 as an analogous case to its issue. Lappin quoted the JPictures proposition that "First Amendment rights to 'freedom of
speech' [and] of the press' do not create any per se right of access
to government property or activities simply because such access
150 See Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Proposalto Reform
Military Regulation ofMedia Coverageof Combat Operations,28 USFLR 957,
982 (1994) (discussing the "Pentagon Papers," NY Times Co. v. United States
decision on First Amendment media restriction for purposes of national
security).
15
See generally Steger, supranote 150; see generally New York Times Co. v.
United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (per curium).
152
See JP Pictures, Inc. v. Dept. of Defense, 86 F.3d 236 (1996); Nation
Magazine v. Dept. of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (1991).
15386 F.3d 236 (1996).
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154
might lead to more thorough or better reporting."'
However, the court was incorrect in drawing this analogy. First,
government intervention during wartime is its own distinguishable
situation, as unique and unrelated to the issues presented in
Lappin. During a time of war, the media serves as the window for
the American perception of military activity and thus the gage of
American political status overseas. Therefore, the media serves as
a significant bastion of knowledge and thus as a check on public
perception of governmental foreign activity. However, in doing
so, there are legitimate points where government regulation of this
1 55
media coverage is necessary to preserve national security.
Secondly, the Lappin court itself acknowledged that cases such as
JPPictures,Inc. were not relevant to the issues that were before
it,
156
contexts.
different
in
cases
access
media
upon
but still relied
At issue in JP Pictures, was the constitutionality of a
Department of Defense (DOD) policy adopted during the Gulf
War that restricted the media and public from viewing the return of
deceased soldiers to Dover Air Force Base. 157 Plaintiffs argued
that the Dover access policy was discriminatory, or constituted
"viewpoint discrimination" because the government did not want
any type of anti-war images broadcast to the public.1 58 However,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found no merits
in the discrimination claim because the Dover access
policy was
59
public.1
the
as
well
as
media
the
to
equally
applied
Alternatively, in Lappin national security was not a risk for the
government. Nevertheless, the court considered JP Pictures,
which mandates for the restriction of First Amendment press
protection during war, pursuant to the specific DOD regulations at
issue. In Lappin, the government's argument against allowing

154

See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1012.

155
5

See Steger, supranote 150 and accompanying text.
134 F. Supp.2d at 1012 ("Although no direct comparison can be

1 6 Lappin,

made between the atmosphere of prison, specifically execution chambers, and
any
other part of the world at large. . .
1
17 JP PicturesInc., 86 F.3d at 236.
5

1 1 Id. at

239.

"s9 Id. at 240.
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Plaintiffs to air the execution was the maintenance of prison
security. 16 However, the risk to prison security that McVeigh's
Internet execution would have posed is not even comparable to the
level of risk being discussed in JP Pictures. The court in Lappin
did rely upon one similar proposition as used in JP Pictures, an
"overriding government interest, to deny the media the right to
access the respective information. 61 The JP Picturescourt stated
that broadcasting war causalities would increase anti-war
sentiment, whereas broadcasting soldiers going off to war would
increase war support amongst the public. 162 On a policy level the
court was concerned with maintaining public support for the war.
Similarly, in Lappin the court cited a governmental interest for
barring the broadcast of McVeigh's execution. It stated that in the
"special environment of a prison" a regulation is valid regardless
of whether it infringes upon a prisoner's First Amendment rights,
16 3
so long as it is "related to legitimate penologoical interests."'
The government stated that these penological interests included
maintaining order and safety within the prison.1'4 However,
similar to the policy which undermined media access in JP
Pictures, the penological interests of Lappin were tied to a
governmental incentive. The government's argument in ,P
Pictures was more legitimate than that in Lappin, as it was tied to
the preservation of national unity, confidential military strategy
and national security during a time of war.
The level of risk that the governmental incentive was protecting
in Lappin was much less severe than that posed in JP Pictures.
For instance, the prisoners of USPTH would not have had
immediate access to the Internet to view the actual execution,
whereas in JPPicturesthe issue was based on the public's ability
to view casualties of war on the television.' 6 5 It is most likely
accurate to assume that most federal prisoners in maximum.6 Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1008.
161 See Id.; see also JPPicturesInc., 86 F.3d at 239.
162
jp Pictures,Inc., 86 F.3d at 239.

163 Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1016.
164 Id.
16

1 See JPPicturesInc., 86 F.3d. at 238.
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security prisons do not have Internet hook-ups within their cells.
Considering this reality, how could prison security have been
disturbed by an Internet broadcast of McVeigh's execution?
Albeit prisoners would have been aware of the airing, they most
likely would not have had access to it.
When Judge Tinder looked to other media access cases that he
felt could have "no direct comparison" 166 to the issue before him,
he failed to look at the other piece of Gulf War litigation that also
dealt with media access in the wake of a potential national security
problem. In Nation Magazine v. Dept. of Defense,16 7 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York emphasized the
importance of First Amendment guarantees and consequently
168
refused to "define the outer constitutional boundaries of access."
At issue in Nation Magazine were Department of Defense
regulations which were promulgated when the United States sent
troops to the Middle East in 1990.169 The effect of these
regulations was to restrict media access and coverage of events
during the Gulf War, and the means to achieve this goal was
through the establishment of media pools.170 Although this court
established a clear ruling on such an "abstract" constitutional
question, its rationale clearly distinguished between different
forums in which the media has traditionally sought access. 171 It
stated that ". . .military operations are not closely 172
akin to a
courtroom."
a
or
park
a
to
nor
building such as a prison,
Nevertheless, it is most likely accurate to state that the
"overriding government interest" in JP Pictures was not
comparable to that in Lappin. Further, in light of a discussion of
JPPictures, it would have been prudent for the court in Lappin to
discuss Nation Magazine, and its important factual distinctions as
well. In the interest of equity and time, a court should not just
166 Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1011.
167

762 F. Supp. 1558 (1991).

168
Nation Magazine, supra note 167, at 1572.
169

Id.at 1563.

170
Id.
171 id.
172 ird.
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arbitrarily attempt to compare a first impression issue to nonbinding case law that is not comparable in order to further an
argument that just follows other precedent. Therefore, the Lappin
court erred when it relied upon authority with such a far-reaching
analogous reach.
B. A FirstImpression Forum: The DistinctNature of the Internet
There is no doubt that our society has become dependent upon
various luxuries the Internet has to offer, such as its interactive
capabilities. However, the interactive nature of the Internet is
what has also presented a problem in dealing with its status within
the legal sphere. Should the Internet receive the same First
Amendment protection that other, more traditional, forms of media
do? Specifically, should the unique characteristics of the Internet
allow for a broader First Amendment protection?
These questions are growing in relevancy, as legal questions
concerning the Internet continue to develop in contemporaneous
courts. Congress has even promulgated legislation in order 1to
73
provide structure in this formerly gray Constitutional area.
However, what is acceptable in cyberspace sometimes remains
unclear.17 4 In rendering its decision, Lappin erroneously failed to
acknowledge the special role of the Internet. In fact, the court
barely mentioned it. 17 5 This section will propose that not only did

Lappin overlook a 1997 landmark Supreme Court decision which
involves Internet constitutionality, but it also overlooked a less
restrictive alternative as provided by the court in Sable
173 One major example of governmental Internet regulation is the

Communication Decency Act of 1996, passed by Bill Clinton in order to control
the amount of obscene, indecent and patently offensive material available in
cyberspace. See generally Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, The Communications
Decency Act of 1996, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 336 (1997).
174
See Spiliopoulos, supra note 173, at 359 ("Because of the problems of
defining speaker and listener on the Intemet, the traditional notions of
constitutionality -protected "speech" must be re-worked to encompass this
inter-active medium. The legal standards that govern the Internet much also
change
to reflect that progress").
175
See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1019.
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76

Communications v. F.C.C.1

1. Should the InternetServe as a Communication Vehiclefor
CapitalPunishment?
In 1997, the Supreme Court faced the question of defining the
parameters of what is adequate Internet communication in Reno v.
A CL U.1 77 At issue in Reno was the constitutionality of the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") of 1996 when Plaintiff
ACLU alleged that it violated the First Amendment.' 78 The Court
noted that each medium of expression will present its own
constitutional problems, 179 and that the Internet is not as invasive
8
as other forms of communication, like radio or television. 0
Furthermore, it found that the CDA was a content-based regulation
which improperly restricted speech. 181
The Court analyzed the distinguishable characteristics of the
Internet, and Justice Stevens described it as "this dynamic,
multifaceted category of communication includes not only
traditional print and news services, but also audio, video and still
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue."' 182 It was also
noted that the Internet is not a "scarce" tool, but rather a ubiquitous
form of communication that is inexpensive and relatively
unlimited.' 83 Therefore, Justice Stevens placed the Internet in its
own constitutional category and 84rejected any analogy between the
Internet and broadcast medium.'
176 492 U.S.
177

115 (1989).
521 U.S. 844 (1997).

178Id.

179 Id. at

(1975)).

180 Id. at

868 (quoting Southeastern Promotions Ltd. V. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
869 (using language from Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726

(1978)).
'"'
Id. at 868.
82
1

Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.

183

Id.

184 Justice

Stevens rejected previous Supreme Court decisions made in Red Lion
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and Pacifica v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See
generallyId.
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Lappin failed to discuss, unlike Reno, the unique status of the
Internet as an information vehicle and its ubiquitous nature as a
source for information and media tool. Rather Judge Tinder
quoted Marshall McLuhan's 1960s exclamation the "medium is
the message," but never discussed the medium at all. 185 Access to
the World Wide Web, as a constant and universal information
pool, should be distinguished from other forms of media, such as
print media and traditional commercial media. 8 6 Should courts
give Internet media a higher level of First Amendment protection,
because of the very nature of the information source? Lappin
certainly did not, and this essay is proposing that it should have.
Lappin erred when18 7 it did not use the Internet standard as
articulated by Reno.
Like the contested regulation in Reno, the regulation in Lappin
involved a piece of federal legislation that restricted
communication where the Internet was the medium. Also similar
to Reno, Lappin should have applied stricter scrutiny because the
Internet and First Amendment allegations were concerned. The
Supreme Court has stated that deference to Congress cannot limit
judicial inquiry where First Amendment rights are involved.
Therefore, Lappin erred when it relied upon the media access
cases, but failed to distinguish the medium at issue in both.
Furthermore, it also erred when it did not apply Reno and its
progeny.
2. Less RestrictiveAlternative?: The Sable BalancingTest
The Supreme Court has not merely looked at the modes of
communication when discussing "right to access" but, in a
balancing test, have also found First Amendment rights to free
speech inherently more significant that in protecting certain
interest groups. In Sable Communications v. F.C.C.,88 Justice
White held that a "dial-a-porn" service was acceptable speech
...
See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1006.
116 See generallyId.
187 See Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
18'

492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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under the First Amendment. 189 Although obscene, the court
determined that this pornography phone service did not reach the
obscenity level required for government regulation of First
Amendment protection.1 90 The Court noted the special protection
extended to children. 191 In balancing the potential danger to
children against the burden that would be imposed on First
Amendment rights, the Court decided that the need to protect the
freedom of speech and press was more significant. 192 The
rationale behind this decision was based primarily on the fact that
adult-to-adult communication should not be inhibited when
children's 93
access to the pornography porn service can be
1
controlled.
The court in Lappin could have used an end-means balancing
test like Sable, instead of relying on minimally analogous case
law. First, similar to the "dial-a-porn" in Sable, which was not
readily available to any one user, the broadcast of McVeigh's
execution in Lappin would have been controlled because the
medium would have been the Internet. In both of these instances,
the user needed to take affirmative steps to access the desired
information. Neither phones nor Internet sites are as accessible as
television and print medium. Secondly, in Sable, the court was
willing to overlook the traditionally strong policy interests in
protecting children in order to uphold First Amendment
principles. 194 The court in Lappin could have upheld First
89

Id.at 131.

190 Idl.

19 1 Id.

192M.at 126 ("The Government may, however, regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if is
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest... it is not
enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be
carefully tailored to achieve these ends").
93 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 ("Under our precedents, § 223(b) Is not a
narrowly tailored effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors
from being exposed to indecent telephone messages... § 223(b)... has the
invalid effect of limiting the content of adult conversations to that which is
suitable
for children to hear").
94
1 Id. at 126 ("We have recognized that there sis a compelling
interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest
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Amendment rights of the press and public by applying a Sable
ends-means balancing test. If the Supreme Court was willing to
overlook the interest of children in the name of freedom of
expression, than the District Court in Lappin surely could have
chose to champion First Amendment principles also.
V.

IMPACT

Within the past decade, where violent crime and terrorism
remain a reality, the effect has been the continued use of capital
punishment. Consequently it can safely be assumed, that the death
penalty will remain a reality within our criminal justice system.
Simultaneously, modem technology has perpetuated a growing
dependency upon the Internet within our society. The Internet
now performs many functions within the lives of everyday
Americans, as a form of communication, entertainment source,
educational tool and business resource.
In the future, the first impression issue adjudicated in Lappin
will most likely find itself before the courts more frequently as
communication and media technology become more sophisticated.
Contemporary society has witnessed an increase in the amount of
a populace
death penalty executions, 195 simultaneously, amongst
96
Internet.1
the
on
dependence
growing
a
off
who feeds
A. The Benefits andDetriments ofAllowing An "Internet"
Execution
In the aftermath of the enormous domestic and international
attention that Lappin attracted, it is clear that the dividing lines
were drawn over its holding. These lines were drawn between the
extends to shielding minors form the influence of literature that I is not obscene
by adult standards").
195 Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
(providing various death penalty statistics in different jurisdictions; stating that
executions have increased dramatically since 1976).
196 See generally Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
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majority, supporting Lappin who found the thought of an aired
McVeigh execution as repulsive, inhumane or undemocratic, and
the minority who disagreed with Lappin recognizing that there
would have been various benefits in allowing Plaintiffs'
controversial request.
B. Would the Benefits ofAllowing an Internet Execution Outweigh
the Detriments?
Generally speaking, critics of ENI's request to broadcast the
McVeigh execution have based their disapproval upon various
moral foundations. 197 However, where really did the scruples lie
in this situation? Definitely not with Timothy McVeigh, the
unrepentant vigilante who was convicted for the death of 168
people in the name of retribution against the government for their
98
handling of the Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, situations.'
Some critics, stemming from domestic and international circles,
have cited common decency and respect for human life as the basis
of their opposition. "To take satisfaction from watching another
human being die, even on who is an enemy, is to diminish, pervert,
our own humanity. And it no199more purges our grief than a raging
scream drains off our anger."
Others pronounced a fear that airing McVeigh's execution
would have rendered him a martyr, and thus undermine the mass
loss of life that was the consequence of his criminal activity.2 °°
For instance in a condemnation of the death penalty in general,
the London newspaper The Independent stated that American
media has been turning murderers into celebrities for a long
Furthermore, in a flamboyantly anti-American
time.20 1
197

See Infra notes 199 and 201.

198 See Murray, supra note 45, at Al.
199 Raymond A. Schroth, Execution Live: Timothy McVeigh, 37 National
Catholic
Reporter 12 (2001).
200
id.

201

Natasha Walter, The US should execute people in Public,THE INDEPENDENT

(London), May 5, 2001, at 5 ("People who watched laughing, drinking beer,
cheering. This would be horrible, but at least then the United States would be
revealed in its true colours (sic)-not as the decent, humane society that it likes to
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commentary it stated that" . . . if the United States decided to
make every execution public, by televising it, there would be
people who watched out of pure voyeurism.' 20 2 Nevertheless, the
law does not preclude or punish voyeurism.
Furthermore,
voyeurism may not be ethical but it certainly does not bar First
Amendment freedom of press or speech. Whether one would have
viewed McVeigh's execution based on voyeurism, a perverse
curiosity or just plain vengeance, the democratic principles that
our Nation is founded on allow for all of these reasons, and for the
person to express freely their intentions to do so. As Z. Chafee has
stated "there is an individual interest, the need of many men to
express their opinions on matters vital to them ... and a social
interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only
adopt the
wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest
3
20

way.9

Some advocates and critics of the death penalty alike, have
expressed a desire for broadcast executions, for their own
respective reasons. Some death penalty supporters feel that
criminal punishment should be aired. Anti-death penalty groups
also feel that airing an execution such as McVeigh's via the
Internet may be beneficial, the rationale being that it may have a
counter-effect on general death penalty sentiment. That is,
exposing the public to the intricacies of death penalty procedure
may so abhor the public that the effect would be an increase the
anti-death penalty movement. Why exactly is the government
unwilling to expose the public to the graphic details of an
execution if it is willing to use it as a means of punishment?
In Lappin, the government based its objection to ENI's request
on four alleged overriding governmental interests, including "(i)
the preservation of the sensationalizing of executions (ii) the
preservation of the solemnity of executions (iii) the maintenance of
security and good order in the Federal Prison System, and (iv)
sell itself as, but as the barbaric country that it is, a country that kills and kills
again, in the fact of all international condemnation").
202 id.
20
1 See

Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Z. Chafee, FREE

SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

33 (1954)).
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protection of the privacy rights of a condemned individual, the
victims, their families and those who participate in carrying out the
execution." 20 4 The court in Lappin was persuaded by these
arguments, and erred when it neither questioned nor critically
analyzed the government's contentions. Instead of recognizing
these arguments as recycled excuses for government censorship
and manipulation of the media, it avoided taking a progressive
step, maintained the status quo and routinely applied stare
decisions.
Possibly the most legitimate government argument was to avoid
sensationalizing the execution. 20 5 "No restrictions whatsoever are
placed on how the media representatives report ...

they seek not

just to view the execution-they seek to film it and broadcast it
simultaneously over the Internet so that anyone willing to pay a fee
for viewing this event can do so." '20 6 However, the government
aired the execution itself in Oklahoma City, the only difference is
that they did not charge the victims a fee. It was argued Plaintiffs'
proposal to make the broadcast a 'pay-per-view' would have
207 The fact that was not highly publicized was
sensationalized it.
that the fee was only $1.95 and that the funds raised were intended
on going to charities established for the 168 victims of the
Oklahoma-city bombing. 8
Nevertheless, the government stated that it wanted to preserve
the 'solemnity' of executions, however, on the day of execution it
did not ban the public outside from selling tee shirts or the media
The third policy
circus surrounding the prison outside.20 9
consideration was for the maintenance of safety within prisons,
although as already discussed,2 1 0 it is highly unlikely that if
McVeigh's execution had been broadcast that prison safety would
204

See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d at 1017-18.

205 id.
206

Id. at 1006.
id.
208 Rex W. Huppke, Webcast of McVeigh Execution Sought; InternetFirm Ties
Suit to FirstAmendment, THE SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE, April 18, 2001, at Al.
209
See Walter, supra, note 201 and accompanying text.
210
See supra pp.27-28.
207
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have been at high risk. The final "overriding interest" of the
government in Lappin, protection of the privacy rights of a
condemned individual, the victims, their families, n is quite
interesting considering two factors.
First, McVeigh wanted his execution to be broadcast, therefore
it could have been presumed that his privacy concerns were nonexistent. 212 Moreover, the victims of the Oklahoma bombings
were not provided their privacy during the on-going media
coverage of the bombing aftermath. Therefore, privacy concerns
could not have been substantially overriding. Secondly, the
government has not prohibited Internet cameras currently placed
within a prison in Maricopa County, Arizona, by Sheriff Joe
Arpaio.213 Arpaio has gained a reputation as being the "America's
toughest sheriff," and has waged a personal war on all prison
inmates within his county in order to deter crime.2 14 Presently, on

http://www.crime.com, 'Jailcam' images are accessible 24 hours a
day.215 These Jailcams cover live feed from four different web
cameras, which convey anything from a sleeping inmate, to an
211 See
212 See

Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d 1002.
supra,note 1.

Joe Arpaio is an infamous figure in Arizona. As both a potential
gubernatorial candidate, highly recognized political figure, and Sheriff of
Maricopa County, Arpaio has taken a hard-line approach to crime. For instance,
coffee, cigarettes and pornography are all prohibited in Maricopa County's Jail.
Inmates are forced to wear pink underwear, eat green bologna, put on chain
gangs and to dig human graves. Amnesty International has declared him a
human rights violator, whereas back in Arizona he covets an eighty-five percent
approval rating. Although he is highly supported in his home state, Arapio has
not gone with out high levels of controversy. The government has not yet
intervened in Arpaio's Internet Jailcams, not surprisingly since Arapio also
donated major contributions to the Bush campaign last year. For an entire
discussion on Arapio's background, politics, and controversy see generally
213

Barry Graham, Star of Justice,HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April 1, 2001, at 59.; For

information on the pending class action that Arapio is defending against several
inmates, who have pressed suit based on the unconstitutionality of the Internet
Jailcams, see also Maricopa County Seeks Dismissal of $1.4 Billion Jailcam

Suit, July 17, 2001, at 11; To visit the Internet Jailcams go to,
http://www.crime.com.
214
215

See generally Graham, supra note 213.
See supra,note 213 and accompanying text.
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inmate undressing, and other imaginable daily prison-cell
occurrences. 216 This Internet feed has ended up being highly
popular, since the continuing local, popular figure created them.
Could it not be stated that this instance is an overriding disrespect
to the privacy issues within prisons that the government cited in
Lappin?
Although the government did have an interest in McVeigh's
execution, it cannot be said that that interest was overriding
enough to suppress First Amendment press and speech clauses.
The Framers of the Constitution unambiguously incorporated both
of these guarantees into the language of the First Amendment,
thus, they intended for a very free press. Additionally, they used
this language to ensure a check on the government, and any
attempt by the government to suppress free speech. When Lappin
denied Plaintiffs the access desired based on the aforementioned
policies, it rendered these guarantees as superfluous and irrelevant.
C. Will Lappin Have a DirectFutureImpact?
Thus, our society remains a puzzling one. Our government must
have suddenly developed a sense of selective ethics by the time of
Lappin, based on the public policy concerns they cited as their
basis for prohibiting the broadcast of McVeigh's execution.217
Our major networks have the First Amendment right to broadcast
our president speak of his sexually explicit endeavors, air "reality"
television programs that promote sexual exploitation and
infidelity, and perpetuate a Jerry Springer culture, notwithstanding,
our public retains the First Amendment right to receive that
information. Moreover, a New York public radio station and
ABC-TV's Nightline both aired live tape-recorded portions of
certain Georgia executions. 2 18 Furthermore, an Arizona sheriff has
2 16

id.

217

See Lappin, 134 F. Supp.2d 1002.

Twenty-three executions performed in Georgia from 1983-1998 were taperecorded by the prison in order to insulate itself against any potential litigation
according to the Department of Correction. Although executions in Georgia are
no longer tape-recorded, the ones that have been have broadcast on both radio
218

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss1/11

40

2002]

Frost: The Constitutionality of an Internet Execution: Lappin v. Enterta

BROADCASTING AND THE DEATHPENALTY

213

been allowed to place Internet cameras within prison cells that
provide live feed of various questionable prison activities to any
inquisitive web surfer.21 9 Yet the government, using its regulation,
forbade the press access to broadcast an event, albeit an unpleasant
one, may have helped provide closure to a tragedy that transcended
every Americans' life.
Although a sad state of affairs, the examples stated above help
illustrate how American 'pop culture' maintains itself on many
facets of voyeurism. Whether this characteristic is an ethical one
is questionable, but one certainty is that it is legal. Nothing in our
Constitution, even from a contextual perspective, outlaws morbid
curiosity or political controversy. In fact, it was drafted to allow
its citizenry the right to express either of these impulses. Rather,
what the Constitution does require is for the freedom of the press
and freedom of speech. 220 From a legal standpoint, and without
taking away from the horrific magnitude of the Oklahoma
bombing, it is hard to reconcile this contradiction as it erodes First
Amendment rights of the public and the press alike.
With a record as notorious as his execution, until recently,
Timothy McVeigh was probably the most hated and boggling
In the past few
criminal figure in recent American history.
months, however, another has filled his shoes. It can safely be
assumed that Osama Bin Laden is presently the most disgusted and
wanted man in the world. The national tragedy of September 1 1 th
has left a permanent impression upon our population on many
levels, psychologically, economically, and politically. Moreover,
the legal system has not gone untainted. American constitutional
liberties are being redefined and partially restricted every day.
Anti-terrorism legislation has been passed which has placed
and television. A New York public radio station, WNYC, broadcast the tapes
nationally. ABC-TV's Nightline had also planned on broadcasting portions of

the tape-recorded executions as of earlier this year. Additionally at this time,
complete recordings of nineteen of these executions, including two situations
where the convicted needed second bursts of electricity to die, were to be posted
on the internet. See Larry McShane, I Hearda Pop':Radio Show Airs Tapes
From
Executions, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 3, 2001, at 8.
219
See supra note 213.

220 Id.
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221
constitutional restraints upon every American's lifestyle.
Specifically, for instance, this new legislation allows for the
detention of suspected terrorists
for an unspecified amount of time,
222
charge.
formal
any
without
These constitutional restrictions are just one of many changes
that our society has begun to see in the aftermath of September
11th. The media, as well as the government, has a vested interest
in the alteration of constitutional privileges.
Currently the
manhunt for Bin Laden, and anyone remotely related to him, is the
focus of domestic and international media attention. Domestic
coverage of the 'war of terrorism' has been relatively uninhibited
as far as the public is concerned. The government's use of the
media as a political tool and has not only served as a forum to
condemn terrorism, but also to increase patriotism and support for
their efforts in Afghanistan. Perhaps that is what our public needs,
moreover wants in the present confusing and fearful time.
The government is allowing the public to watch a bloody
manhunt for the world's most wanted man, but it wouldn't let the
media to air the execution of America's former number one
criminal. Hopefully Bin Laden and those responsible for the
terrorist attacks will be apprehended. When this happens, will the
government allow their execution over the Internet?
Will the
public want to see it, moreover, will the public push for live
retribution so badly that the government will have to bow to their
concerns? These questions are highly sensitive and cannot be
answered immediately. In the event that they arise however
Lappin will undoubtedly resurface.
VI. CONCLUSION

At the time of controversy even Fox Broadcasting, probably an
enclave of the media most notorious for extending extreme First
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Amendment rights, shunned the notion of broadcasting McVeigh's
execution. Had ENI beat Fox at its own game? Without
attempting to engage in unnecessary speculation, it is quite
possible that if Fox had thought of the idea before ENI, or had
technological capability to do so, it may not have been so critical
of the idea. When dealing with such a highly sensitive issue, no
news station or Internet company would want to be the first entity
to attempt to air such controversial subject matter.
Plaintiffs ENI and Liveontheweb.com broke that mold, and
decided to be the first until they were enjoined by the court.
Subsequently, CBS admitted that it would have possibly aired a
clip of the execution if it were allowed to, while C-SPAN
embraced the notion of televised executions and felt that the
government should allow some form of media access. 2 3 After the
onset of the highly controversial litigation that Lappin brought,
many major networks publicly deemed the notion of an Internet
execution as morally repugnant. However, a week before
McVeigh's first scheduled execution 1,400 journalists amassed
outside Terre Haute's federal prison like a group of school
children, vying for "front row seats," or any other contact from
22 4
within.
The Lappin court refused to even acknowledge, much less
discuss, the wide First Amendment freedoms allotted to the media
and entertainment industry as a whole in regard to entertainment or
information. Perhaps had this not been a facial challenge, but
instead as-applied, the court would have been more willing to
circumvent its application of the execution regulation in this
specific instance. The goal of this Note was not to endorse the
Internet broadcast of all executions to the point, for instance,

Diane Holloway, The greatdebate of televising executions, Cox New
Service, June 9, 2001.
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See Jennifer Harper, PublicEschews McVeigh 's Execution, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 3, 2001, at A8. McVeigh was originally scheduled to
be executed on May 16, 2001. However, due to a last minute document
discovery by the defense, that resulted in the FBI producing 4,000 formerly
unknown documents, the Court granted a stay of execution.; see also Murray,
supra note 45, at Al.
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where children or other special interest groups could access them.
There is a real danger that in that instance, that the memorable
slippery slope would emerge, making live executions a
mainstream, Friday night, popcorn-filled event. However the
proposed broadcast of the execution of Timothy McVeigh was a
unique event of its own, especially considering the Internet was the
proposed medium.
Although case law has stated that the press gets no special
access rights above the public generally, the issue presented to the
court in Lappin was indeed unprecedented. Therefore, the court
erred in refusing to acknowledge the many unique circumstances
of the situation before it. Instead, it relied on recycled policy
notions and case law that was not necessarily applicable to the
issue at bar. In doing so the Lappin decision undermined the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. This
issue, however, is not a dead one. Rather, the constitutional
boundaries of what the press can and cannot access have been
forever changed with the invention of the Internet. The death
penalty will most likely also not evaporate from our criminal
justice system. In situations like Lappin, when the two become
inextricably intertwined, it will be up to the courts to decide where
to draw the line.
The recent horrific events of September 1 1 th have created a
broadcast war, on both the television and the Internet; therefore,
the Lappin issue will most likely surface before the judiciary
again. What will happen if Osama Bin Laden, or other parties
responsible for September 1 1 th, is captured?
Surely many
members of the public and press, including perhaps the
government, will relish at the possibility of watching his execution
on the Internet. The Lappin decision, however, will not allow that
until the government can materialize an "overriding government
concern" for doing so, or inversely until the judiciary finds that the
government has no "overriding government concern" to prevent it.
Kristen Frost
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